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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2702 
_____________ 
 
COMMUNITY PRESCHOOL & NURSERY OF EAST LIBERTY, LLC, 
                                                                              Appellant  
 
v. 
 
TRI-STATE REALTY, INC. 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00979) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 
March 11, 2011 
_____________ 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: June 7, 2011) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Tri-State Realty, Inc. (“Tri-State”) leased a portion of its building to Community 
Preschool & Nursery of East Liberty, LLC (“Community Preschool”).  After a fire in the 
building damaged the property and forced Community Preschool to vacate the premises, 
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Community Preschool sued Tri-State for damages.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Tri-State.  We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case, we relate only those facts necessary to our analysis. 
 Tri-State leased the first floor of its two-story building to Community Preschool.  
Before Community Preschool moved in, Tri-State obtained a permit from the City of 
Pittsburgh allowing occupancy of the first floor and stating that the second floor was to 
remain vacant.  Tri-State subsequently renovated the second floor and leased it to 
multiple occupants.  Tri-State did not, however, acquire an occupancy permit for the 
second floor, nor did it have the second floor’s renovated electrical system inspected.  
Shortly after moving in, one of the second-floor occupants complained to Tri-State about 
problems with electrical service in the building.  Tri-State responded by stating that it had 
recently updated the building’s wiring and meters.  It does not appear that Tri-State 
investigated the matter any further. 
 Approximately fifteen months later, a fire broke out in the building, destroying the 
second floor and damaging much of the first floor.  The Pittsburgh Fire Department 
investigated the fire and concluded that it originated in the wiring in the ceiling above the 
second floor.  Tri-State subsequently exercised its option under the lease agreement to 
terminate the lease with Community Preschool in lieu of repairing the premises.   
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 Community Preschool filed this lawsuit three months later.  After the District 
Court dismissed two claims that are not the subject of this appeal, Community Preschool 
filed an amended complaint asserting claims for negligence and breach of contract.   
 During discovery, Tri-State and Community Preschool secured expert testimony 
concerning the cause of the fire.  Community Preschool’s expert concluded that “[t]he 
fire was likely electrical in origin” and that “[o]ccupancy of the second floor increased 
the probability of a fire event.”  (A. 393.)  Tri-State’s expert agreed that an electrical fault 
caused the fire.  He also noted, however, that wiring servicing the first floor ran though 
the ceiling over the second floor and would have been used even if the second floor had 
remained unoccupied.  He further explained that some potential causes, such as faulty 
wires or improper installation, might not have been detectable upon inspection.  
Accordingly, Tri-State’s expert opined that occupancy of the building’s second floor “had 
nothing to do with the ignition or spread of this fire.”  (A. 443.)  Additionally, two 
investigators from the Pittsburgh Fire Department concluded that an electrical 
malfunction caused the fire, but neither investigator could identify the root cause of the 
malfunction.   
 Tri-State moved for summary judgment on the ground that Community Preschool 
was unable to adduce competent evidence that occupancy of the second floor was a 
substantial factor in causing the fire.  The District Court agreed.  Specifically, with 
respect to the negligence claim, the District Court concluded that the record lacked any 
evidence that Tri-State’s alleged breach of a duty caused the fire.  The Court also 
concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.   With respect to the 
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claim for breach of contract, the District Court found that there was insufficient evidence 
that Tri-State breached the lease’s warranty of quiet enjoyment.  Community Preschool 
now appeals. 
II. 
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s summary judgment order.  Shook v. Avaya Inc., 625 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2010). 
A. 
 Community Preschool argues that the District Court erroneously granted summary 
judgment on its negligence claim.  In Pennsylvania, “[t]here are four elements to a cause 
of action for negligence:  a duty of care, a breach of that duty, a causal connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury, and damages.”  Zeidman v. 
Fisher, 980 A.2d 637, 639 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009).  Although a party may prove its case 
with circumstantial evidence, “there is a limit to the inferences that the jury may 
reasonably draw from such circumstantial evidence.”  Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 961 A.2d 
1229, 1241 (Pa. 2008).  Specifically, “while the jury may draw reasonable inferences, it 
may not be permitted to reach its verdict merely on the basis of speculation or conjecture, 
but . . . there must be evidence upon which logically its conclusion may be based.”  Id. at 
1241-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Even if we assume that Tri-State breached its duty to Community Preschool by 
leasing space on the second floor, Community Preschool’s negligence claim fails because 
it cannot prove that Tri-State’s allegedly negligent conduct caused the fire.  It is 
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undisputed that the electrical wiring that delivered power to the first floor ran though the 
ceiling over the second floor, where the fire originated.  These wires would have been in 
use regardless of whether the second floor was vacant or occupied.  Accordingly, the fire 
could have started even if the second floor remained vacant.  Community Preschool has 
mustered no evidence showing that the presence of tenants on the second floor had 
anything to do with the outbreak of the fire.  Absent any evidence specifically linking 
occupancy of the second floor to the fire, Community Preschool cannot satisfy the 
causation element of its negligence claim.   
 Community Preschool argues that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur establishes 
causation.  That doctrine allows a court to infer that a defendant’s negligence harmed the 
plaintiff only when:  
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in 
the absence of negligence; 
 
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the 
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the 
evidence; and 
 
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the 
defendant’s duty to the plaintiff. 
 
Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 100 (Pa. 1974) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 328D (1965)).  Res ipsa loquitur does not apply here.  First, the fire could very 
well have occurred without any negligence on the part of Tri-State.  None of the experts 
who studied the fire could identify a cause more specific than “electrical malfunction.”  
Although Tri-State did not arrange for an inspection of the second floor wiring, its expert 
opined that an inspection might not have revealed the problem that started the fire.  
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Second, Community Preschool did not sufficiently eliminate other possible causes of the 
fire.  For example, defective wires, which would have had nothing to do with Tri-State’s 
alleged negligence, could have caused the fire to ignite.  Accordingly, the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine cannot be used here to establish a causal relationship between the fire 
and Tri-State’s conduct in leasing the second-floor space. 
B. 
 Community Preschool also appeals the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment on its breach of contract claim.  Specifically, Community Preschool avers that 
Tri-State breached the lease agreement’s covenant of quiet enjoyment.  Appellant 
concedes that this argument rests entirely on whether Tri-State caused the fire.  Because 
we have concluded that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to causation, we will 
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
